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Abstract
We focus on the development of effective adversarial
patch attacks and – for the first time – jointly address
the antagonistic objectives of attack success and obtru-
siveness via the design of novel semi-transparent patches.
This work is motivated by our pursuit of a systematic per-
formance analysis of patch attack robustness with regard
to geometric transformations. Specifically, we first eluci-
date a) key factors underpinning patch attack success and
b) the impact of distributional shift between training and
testing/deployment when cast under the Expectation over
Transformation (EoT) formalism. By focusing our analy-
sis on three principal classes of transformations (rotation,
scale, and location), our findings provide quantifiable in-
sights into the design of effective patch attacks and demon-
strate that scale, among all factors, significantly impacts
patch attack success. Working from these findings, we then
focus on addressing how to overcome the principal limita-
tions of scale for the deployment of attacks in real physical
settings: namely the obtrusiveness of large patches. Our
strategy is to turn to the novel design of irregularly-shaped,
semi-transparent partial patches which we construct via a
new optimization process that jointly addresses the antago-
nistic goals of mitigating obtrusiveness and maximizing ef-
fectiveness. Our study – we hope – will help encourage
more focus in the community on the issues of obtrusiveness,
scale, and success in patch attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has demonstrated performance
seemingly on par with humans for various problems such as
medical image diagnostics [4], game playing [9], and other
tasks [7]. However this apparent success has been met with
the prospect [5] that deep networks are very fragile to adver-
Figure 1. [top] Demonstrating the impact on patch attack suc-
cess for test-time transformations sampled out-of-distribution.
[bottom] A novel method for generating semi-transparent patch
attacks to address the balance between patch scale, obtrusiveness,
and success. (Toaster patch used above from [2])
sarial attacks, which motivated many studies in the past sev-
eral years researching methods for attacks and defenses, and
the corresponding significant growth of interest in the com-
munity in the field of adversarial machine learning (AML)
specifically applied to DL models. Several approaches to
AML as applied to DL have been envisioned, and a simple
taxonomy useful to frame the goals for this work consists
of distinguishing between a) generating attacks that affect
an entire image, are designed to work on a specific image,
and are carried out by additive non-perceivable perturba-
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Figure 2. Constrained EoT limits the range of transformations
(e.g., rotation angles, scales, etc.) for optimizing the patch, but
increases the range used at test time. Test time transformations are
assumed to be unconstrained as this is consistent with many real
world use cases.
tions (such as in [13], [5], [11], [10]), vs. b) attacks that are
confined to a specific sub-window of the image and are de-
signed to affect a wide set of images and classes of objects
(i.e., a patch attack).
Attacks that are of interest for this work use the approach
in (b). These attacks are more suitable to be implemented
in the physical domain since they can be printed on con-
tiguous surfaces and placed more easily in a scene – a sig-
nificant concern for applications such as automotive and
robotic autonomy and related areas. The first successful
design of such an attack was reported in [2] where it was
demonstrated that an adversarial patch can be designed by
using a loss function that includes a term that expresses an
expectation over geometric transformations including rota-
tion, translation and scale. This was based on work origi-
nally reported in [1].
Additionally, and to better frame our motivations here,
when it comes to patch attacks for physical scenes, one
must distinguish between the specific case (where attacks
are generated and optimized for a particular scene) and
the general case (where attacks are generated without any
prior knowledge of the scene/context in which they will be
placed). In the former scenario, patch patterns and place-
ment may be optimized more highly given greater knowl-
edge about the attack scene. However, we focus on the
latter scenario which makes fewer assumptions about the
scene and is thus likely to produce attacks that generalize
more effectively. We wish to understand the robustness of
deep neural networks to attacks developed for these scenar-
ios and then design the most effective attacks under these
assumptions.
2. Contributions
The novel contributions of this are as follows: a) we
present a principled methodology for the evaluation of patch
attacks and the train/test-time factors that impact their suc-
cess. In particular, we study, under the framework of the ex-
pectation over transformation approach, the impact of dis-
tributional differences between patch optimization and de-
ployment conditions and their subsequent effect on patch
attack success. This study allows new insights into factors
leading to attack success and in particular demonstrate that
among all – patch scale is a driving factor for success, and
that rotation factors suffers from a “jack of all-trades, master
of none” pathology. b) Armed with these observations we
next consider the question of how to best design effective
patches. That is, patches that scale up but still retain desir-
able factors with regard to deployment and detectability (i.e.
unobtrusiveness). To our knowledge we report the first ever
design of semi-transparent patches that address these objec-
tives. We also develop a novel c) an optimization frame-
work that results in the design of such patches and d) de-
velop new methods to characterize effectiveness in this new
scale/obtrusiveness/success trade space, and, given scale as
a key limiting factor, we develop a novel measure for patch
obtrusiveness.
3. Analysis of Expectation over Transforma-
tion
3.1. Motivation
This paper focuses on patch-based attacks initially in-
spired by the EoT method first introduced by [1]. Early
experiments with EoT produced results as shown in Fig-
ure 1. In particular, it could be observed that when the test-
time transformation distribution is unconstrained and mis-
matched with the train-time distribution, the patch attack
severely under-performs. Furthermore, as we seek to op-
timize new patches, there has been limited examination of
how to define the patch transformation distributions used in
the optimization.
To dig deeper into these issues, we performed a system-
atic study of the effects of standard patch transformations
on attack success. Specifically, we identify how train and
test-time distributions (and mismatches between them) re-
late to patch effectiveness. Given that EoT is the standard
method for generating patch attacks, our intent is not to dis-
prove the method’s utility but rather to provide quantifiable
evidence and practical insights regarding its usage.
3.2. Expectation over Transformation
In one of the most common formulations of the problem,
an adversarial example is generated by perturbing a clean
input image x (taken from the set of all possible images X)
to produce an adversarial exemplar image, x′, such that a
classifier will produce a correct classification, y (taken from
a set of Y classes) for x, but an incorrect classification, y′,
for x′. Following [1], the perturbation is determined more
formally via optimization:
argmaxx′ P (y
′|x′)
subject to ‖x′ − x‖p < ε (1)
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In the case of a targeted attack, the optimization is designed
to find the x′ that maximizes the likelihood of producing the
targeted label, y′t.
As stated in [1], this approach fails to account for real
world transformations and was thus extended by including
such transformations directly in the optimization process.
The result is a modified optimization:
argmaxx′ Et∼TP (y′|t(x′))
subject toEt∼T [d(t(x), t(x′))] < ε
(2)
where T is a distribution of transforms, d() is a distance
measure, and t(x) is a sampled transform applied to the im-
age x.
This approach was further modified by [2] to produce
patch-based attacks (where perturbations are spatially co-
located) robust to transformations likely to occur in the
physical world. In particular, that work used a patch appli-
cation operator, A(p, x), which applies transformations and
perturbations within a confined spatial region. The result is
the following:
argmax
p
Ex∼X,t∼TP (y′|A(t(p), x)) (3)
Without loss of generality, the focus is on transformations
T including distributions over location, scale, and rotation.
While the above methods demonstrate the advantage of
expanding the optimization to incorporate potential real-
world transformations, the trade-off between attack success
and transformations considered has not yet been investi-
gated and is the focus of our study.
3.3. Constrained Expectation over Transformation
The main endeavor of this section is to determine how
constraints imposed on the distribution of transformations
during the patch optimization affect success when transfor-
mations are unconstrained at test time. For physical attacks,
this is a key question since the attacker can optimize and
place the patch in the scene (under certain transformation
and distributional assumptions) but has no control over the
pose of the system-under-attack, which may present a dis-
tributional shift at attack time. In [1] and [2], the trans-
formations were limited to a small range of rotation angles
and scales. Here we ask whether there is any trade-off or
negative impact on the effectiveness of EoT if the range of
transformations is expanded or mismatched between opti-
mization and testing.
We run a series of experiments (described in Section 4)
with modifications to (2) whereby during the optimization
we consider the distribution T (typically, uniform) over a
compact support T (Figure 2). At test time, we then use
the full support of T to assess patch success. We first per-
form these experiments considering scale and rotation trans-
formations separately, then repeat with scale and rotation
jointly optimized.
The motivation for this formulation and set of experi-
ments is three-fold. First, by creating a difference between
train and test-time transformation distributions, we can as-
sess whether the added constraint improves or degrades
patch success. For instance, we can quantify trade-offs or
benefits that might exist for optimizing over the full range
of rotation angles relative to a smaller number. Addition-
ally, we can further study in isolation the effects of indi-
vidual transformations on patch effectiveness. Lastly, we
can leverage insights gained to more appropriately constrain
patch optimization relative to specific applications. We note
that while we limit our experiments to examining patch ro-
tation, scale, and location, this evaluation can be general-
ized to other relevant transformations under consideration.
4. Experiments
4.1. Base experiment
All of the following experiments are derived from a com-
mon base experiment. Since the primary focus of this
section is on providing a quantitative analysis of the ef-
fects of testing transformations outside the distribution of
training images, we restrict our experiments to a white-
box scenario where the model and architecture used for
patch optimization is the same as the one that undergoes the
patch attack. We view this as a best case scenario in light
of the challenges with attack transferability (as discussed
in [3] [8] [12] [15]). All experiments in this paper optimize
and test patch attacks using a ResNet50 [6] model trained
on ImageNet.
In each of the next experiments, we use the following
procedure. First, we select the transformation of interest
and define its corresponding train time support T (e.g., ro-
tation angle θ ∈ [0, 45]). Then, we sample 100 classes uni-
formly from the standard ImageNet classes to be our target
labels and for each class, we optimize a patch attack follow-
ing [2]. This attack is then tested by sampling a test-time
configuration from the full support of the transformation
distribution, T , for each image in a set of 512 randomly
sampled from the ImageNet test set. Patch locations dur-
ing optimization and at attack time are randomized (unless
specified otherwise - Section 4.4 examines this transforma-
tion separately).
4.2. Scale
Question: The scale of patch attacks in the real world
may be the most challenging factor to control at attack time.
Thus, we ask: what is the impact of scale on patch success?
Will patches optimized at small scales maintain effective-
ness at large scales (and vice versa)?
Approach: These questions address whether the patch
optimization process is producing patterns that rely on fine-
grained details or embody general yet robust attack pat-
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Figure 3. Results for EoT with variable scale. (top) Shows how
patch performance changes when the minimum scale is fixed and
the maximum scale varies. (bottom) Shows performance differ-
ences starting from a fixed maximum size and allowing the mini-
mum scale to vary. Shades correspond to the range of scales rep-
resented in the expectation. Both plots show attack success rate,
so higher is better.
terns. To address the scale questions, we optimize the set
of patches following the base experiment setup with patch
rotation fixed at 0◦ and location randomized. We perform
two variants of the experiment. The first experiment starts
at a nominal scale, so ∈ [smin, smax], and bounds the sup-
port T such that scale varies from so up to a maximum scale
smax (i.e., [so, smax]). The second experiment starts from a
nominal scale and optimizes from the minimum up to nom-
inal (i.e., [smin, so]). Both experiments allow the full sup-
port at test time with scale sampled from the entire distribu-
tion T ∼ U(smin, smax).
Experiments: Results for both experiments are captured
in Figure 3.
Discussion: Both experiments indicate that patch suc-
cess is highly dependent on scale. We find that patches op-
timized at larger scales are more likely to have success at
Figure 4. Results for EoT when only angles are considered. The
plot shows patch success (higher is better) at test angles from
[−pi, pi]. Each shade of blue represents the maximum angle al-
lowed during patch optimization (darker shades imply more angles
considered).
small scales than patches optimized in the reverse direction.
We attribute this to the fact that a higher resolution for the
patch forces the optimization to place less importance on
individual pixels and to reveal patterns which are preserved
when forced to lower resolutions. Regardless of the opti-
mization approach, the results clearly indicate significant
differences in success rate between large and small patches,
which suggests that additional techniques may be necessary
to overcome this practical limitation (a topic addressed in
Section 5).
4.3. Rotation
Question: We next seek to understand how robust patch
attacks are to out-of-distribution rotations experienced at
test time. We ask the following question: are patch attacks
more robust when the patch is optimized over a larger range
of rotations? how does patch success modulate with respect
to this range?
Approach: We again run the base patch optimization
procedure now holding scale fixed while allowing location
to vary randomly. However, during patch optimization, the
rotation distribution is fixed such that angles are selected
from a bounded support, T , with angles taken from [−θ, θ].
We run a series of variants of the base experiment by vary-
ing θ at intervals of pi/5.
Experiments: Results of the rotation experiments are
captured in Figure 4.
Discussion: The rotation experiments illustrate a jack-
of-all-trades, master-of-none result whereby patches opti-
mized over a wider angle distribution exhibit lower peak
performance yet higher average performance. One possi-
ble explanation for this result is that the conventional for-
mulation of EoT focuses on finding a patch that maximizes
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the target class probability in expectation rather than includ-
ing the rotation transformation directly in the optimization.
While the loss is computed over all rotations sampled dur-
ing a given training batch, the patch is always updated in
its canonical orientation. When taking the expectation, it
is likely that local patch regions compete with each other
at specific angles. As the range of candidate rotations in-
creases, the EoT forces the local regions to become less
competitive so that they are more effective over a range of
angles. However, the undesired effect is that the local region
patterns may have lower performance at specific angles.
4.4. Location
Question: We perform experiments to explore the inci-
dence of the location of adversarial patches in the image on
the attack performance. Specifically, we probe the verac-
ity of the hypothesis that placement of masks at locations
of maximum impact results in maximum attack effectiveness
(where, as we shall explain next, maximum impact is taken
to be maximum saliency).
Approach: We must first clarify again that we’re con-
sidering the general case of patch attacks whereby we op-
timize the patch making assumptions about the types and
range of patch transformations, but make no assumptions
about the scene or context in which the patch attack is ap-
plied. We make this distinction because in the specific at-
tack scenario, a patch and location may be optimized jointly
(or conditionally) if certain characteristics of the scene are
assumed. In this experiment, we focus on the impact of the
presence/absence of systematic biases in the location selec-
tion which may impact patch success. We utilize saliency
(as determined via white-box methods) to identify how a
patch’s placement in regions of high/low importance to the
deep network affect the patch success.
We compute saliency via conventional computation
methods that use gradient descent to find locations in the
input image domain that result in maximum softmax output
for the image class label. The basic hypothesis driving this
choice for location is that, by placing the patch over max-
imally salient locations in the image, the patch will gain
maximum attack potency by both a) occluding the most im-
portant cues leading to the correct label and b) replacing
them with cues targeting the new targeted class.
Experiments: For EOT-based training and testing, we
consider three location strategies, corresponding to mini-
mum and maximum loci in the saliency map as well as ran-
dom location. We then explore the results of attacks using
masks by combining the scenarios of {min, max, random}
train location with {min, max, random} test locations. The
results are shown in tables given in Figure 8. We observe a
strong dependence between patch success and target label.
While we view this as an important relationship to study, for
now we simply capture it by comparing patch performance
binned according to the top, middle and bottom performing
target classes. For each situation we report the mean accu-
racy when computed on a set of images along with addi-
tional statistics (standard deviation, as well as min and max
accuracy).
Discussion: Looking at the results we found that the
highest effectiveness is obtained in general when selecting
the patch placement at test time according to the same rules
as during the optimization (e.g., random location in both).
There is a slight gain in the patch success when placing it in
regions of high saliency, but it is not statistically significant,
and the preference on placing the patch in the same type of
location as it was trained seems to trump other considera-
tions.
On the other hand, if we train randomly, and place the
patch anywhere at attack time, we don’t observe much of
a performance hit. The fact that maximum placement does
not over-perform reveals results that are somewhat counter
to what one would hypothesize and suggests an ’easy-does-
it’ strategy, namely that you don’t have to calculate maxi-
mum saliency at training time and place patches at optimal
locations at attack time. Instead, you can work with random
locations at train and attack time and still achieve results
that are nearly as good as the maximal location.
In sum, location placement is one area in which – unlike
rotation – adopting a lazy approach pays off. While this
result was confirmed in this last set of EoT experiments, it
helps to justify the choice of random location used for the
scale and rotation variants of the base experiment.
5. Improving Patch Attack Effectiveness and
Unobtrusiveness
We observed in Section 4.2 the dominant effect of scale
on patch effectiveness, specifically noting a strong drop-off
in performance as the patch image dimension decreases be-
low 30% of the image edge size. This leads us to ask the
question: can we devise a strategy to increase the patch
size (and subsequent effectiveness) without simultaneously
increasing the observability of the patch itself?
5.1. Approach
First, we must clarify two things. As before, we make the
assumption that the attacker has no control over the camera
pose and so cameras can always be positioned to force the
patch to be arbitrarily small. However, we aim in this sec-
tion to devise a method to increase the patch size to improve
overall patch success.
Second, while we frame the question as one of observ-
ability, we’re not asking it from the standpoint of measuring
limits of human perception. Instead, we view observability
as roughly equated to scene occlusion. To address the mo-
tivating question, we devise a measure of patch obtrusive-
ness. Since a primary advantage of patch-based attacks is
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the ability to print contiguous yet semi-transparent patterns,
we can define patch obtrusiveness as a measure of the over-
all opacity of the patch. Fully opaque patches have maxi-
mal obtrusiveness as they are most easily identified at test
time relative to a nearly transparent patch. Furthermore, our
patch obtrusiveness measure creates a trade space whereby
scale, opacity, and success rate can be optimized together
according to the desired operating point.
More precisely, we measure opacity by first defining a
mask,M , which has the same shape (namely h×w for rect-
angular patches) as the patch P and where Mij ∈ [0, 1] for
each i, j in M . From here, we define patch obtrusiveness
(PO) as:
PO(M) =
total mask value
total mask area
=
∑
i,jMij
hw
(4)
This metric allows us to create some measure of equiv-
alence between small, opaque patches and large, partially
transparent patches. When PO ≈ 0, the patch is essen-
tially transparent and maximally subtle in the image. When
PO = 1, the patch is fully opaque and is equivalent to
the current conventional output from the EoT method. Ul-
timately, our goal is to side-step the scale limitations ob-
served with EoT (as discussed in Section 4.2) and produce
larger, more effective patches without increasing observ-
ability.
Given our definition of PO(M), we now include the
mask M as part of the optimization. Whereas standard
EoT applies a sampled transform t(p) to patch p and then
applies the transformed patch directly over the image x
(i.e., A(t(p), x)), we modify the application function A()
to blend the patch and the image according to the values of
M . Namely, the adversarially attacked image is created as
follows: For all i, j in x,
x′ij = A (t(p), x; t(M))ij
= t(M)ij ∗ t(p)ij + (1− t(M)ij) ∗ xij ,
(5)
where x is the clean image, M is the optimized mask, p is
the optimized patch, and t is the sampled transformation to
apply equally to the patch and mask. We assume that t(p)
produces an image of the same dimension as x where p has
been transformed and placed at a location also valid in x.
Now that we can apply M to the patch to attack a clean
image, we optimize the patch p and mask M simultane-
ously:
argmax
p,PO(M)
Ex∼X,t∼TP (y′|A(t(p), x; t(M))) (6)
For targeted attacks, the optimization loss term for a sin-
gle attacked image is:
Ltotal = Ltarget + γ LPO
Ltarget = CE(y
′, ytarget)
LPO = (PO(M))
2
(7)
where y′ is the label produced by the network for the at-
tacked image x′, CE is the standard cross-entropy loss, and
PO(M) is the patch obtrusiveness defined in (4). Gradients
with respect to the loss term are backpropagated to both the
patch and mask pixels so as optimize them jointly. Due to
differences in the natural scale of the loss terms, we include
γ to allow more control over the competition between patch
obtrusiveness and its ability to fool the attacked network.
5.2. Experiment
Following the base experiment approach described in
Section 4.1, a series of patches (and associated masks) are
optimized and tested over a sampling of target labels and
test images. We hold rotation fixed and use random loca-
tions during patch optimization and evaluation. The rotation
assumption can be viewed as a best case given the results in
Section 4.3 and the location strategy is based on the results
in Section 4.4.
Given γ is designed to control the trade-off between
patch success and obtrusiveness, we employ a curriculum
learning-like procedure whereby minimizing patch obtru-
siveness is prioritized initially then down-weighted later on
to encourage greater patch performance. Inspired by [14],
we change the γ value throughout the patch optimization
process depending on the value of the loss. The γ term
is held fixed until the loss remains below a threshold (e.g.,
nominally 0.1) for a fixed patience period (e.g., min 5 iter-
ations). After the patience period, the γ value is decreased
(according to its schedule) and the process repeats. We ob-
serve during training that changes in γ usually produce a
spike in the loss, so the patience period promotes a cer-
tain degree of stability and is critical to achieving high-
performing semi-transparent patches.
Figure 5 illustrates a standard EoT-based patch attack as
well as an example produced with our approach showing a
sample mask, full patch, and application of both to attack a
clean image.
To test our method, we follow the base experiment setup
but expanding to 1200 iterations during optimization (i.e.,
until convergence) and employing a learning rate of 5.0. We
fix the scale between [0.4, 0.5] and then run the optimiza-
tion. At the end of the process, the final obtrusiveness value
is recorded and the patch is tested on a random set of 512
held-out images.
For the control experiments, we take the final obtrusive-
ness score and label for the semi-transparent patch and pro-
duce a fully-opaque control patch at a scale that achieves
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Figure 5. Example of patch attacks with and without optimization
to balance obtrusiveness and success. Top row is the control patch
and its application to a test image. The bottom row shows the
mask, the full patch, and the application of both to the same test
image.
Figure 6. Partial patch results aggregated over the five top, middle,
and bottom target labels each. Light colors imply greater trans-
parency, larger dots imply larger patches. Results demonstrate
that the larger, semi-transparent patches can be optimized which
perform better than their fully opaque counterpart at the same ob-
trusiveness operating point.
the same obtrusiveness score. Note that because the con-
trol patches have no transparency, they are naturally smaller.
The control patches are optimized for 500 iterations to
achieve target loss convergence (fewer iterations are used
due to the absence of the curriculum required for the obtru-
siveness term). We then evaluate on the same set of held-out
test images and record attack success rates.
Results for these experiments are captured in Figures 6
and 7.
5.3. Discussion
The results from Section 5.2 give us several insights into
the trade-off between obtrusiveness and attack success. We
demonstrate that we can generate patches that achieve sim-
ilar or better success rates with lower obtrusiveness values.
In particular, we see that for a range of operating points
(i.e., obtrusiveness values), we can generate larger patches
that achieve higher success but are more subtle relative to
the standard patch attacks of the same size. This is the first
such demonstration of semi-transparent patches which are
capable of achieving this kind of result.
However, we still recognize several potential avenues for
improvement. First, while we’re the first to define a no-
tion of patch attack obtrusiveness, we have not yet tied it to
a true perceptual measure (necessary if we hope to claim
to avoid detection by a human). Second, we have con-
structed these experiments under rigid assumptions about
rotation and location but could expand them in future iter-
ations. We believe our assumptions are reasonable given
some of the likely physical attack use cases (e.g., patches
on street signs). Additionally, we would reiterate that we
design these experiments for the general attack use case
but could incorporate context and scene details in the op-
timization if we wish to address the scene-specific sce-
nario. Lastly, as in the experiments in Section 4, we have
not fully explored nor explained the impact of target label
on patch success. We observe a clear impact and can hy-
pothesize about why certain labels do better (e.g., due to
scale/deformability/uniformity), but further investigation is
necessary to better characterize these relationships.
6. Conclusions
This paper makes two key contributions: (1) we study
a method and provide results that characterize the impact
of real-world transformations on patch attack optimization
and success, (2) we present a novel objective for the de-
sign of ideal patches that trade obtrusiveness and success
rate, and develop companion approaches for optimization of
patch obtrusiveness for producing more subtle patch attacks
without sacrificing performance. We have demonstrated
that the results of (1) can be directly leveraged to improve
patch attacks (e.g., as shown with (2)). We believe that the
methodology and results presented in this paper will help
provide greater guidance and focus in the community in un-
derstanding patch attack capabilities and limitations. Lastly,
our obtrusiveness measure led to the production of semi-
transparent attacks (for the first time) and opens the door for
exploring many other variants of this approach. With these
results we want to underscore the importance of generating
these attacks (and subsequent defenses) not as a means for
defeating visual recognition systems, but rather as a way to
improve understanding of the robustness of these systems
and gain greater insight into their inner workings and possi-
ble defenses, which is left for future endeavors.
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Figure 7. Partial patch results for the five top (left), middle (center), and bottom (right) performing target labels. Dot size is proportional
to patch size; dot transparency is proportional to patch transparency. In all cases, the obtrusiveness-optimized patches demonstrate better
performance overall compared to the fully opaque control patches.
Mean acc: 0.9604 Mean acc: 0.9448 Mean acc: 0.9068
Standard dev: 0.0130 Standard dev: 0.0214 Standard dev: 0.0402
Maximum acc: "gas mask" :  0.9844 Maximum acc: "football helmet" :  0.9688 Maximum acc: "gas mask" :  0.9609
Minimum acc: "power drill" :  0.9375 Minimum acc: "power drill" :  0.9063 Minimum acc: "chow chow" :  0.8281
Mean acc: 0.9599 Mean acc: 0.9484 Mean acc: 0.8995
Standard dev: 0.0215 Standard dev: 0.0237 Standard dev: 0.0509
Maximum acc: "gas mask" :  0.9844 Maximum acc: "banjo" :  0.9844 Maximum acc: "gas mask" :  0.9688
Minimum acc: "power drill" :  0.8984 Minimum acc: "power drill" :  0.8906 Minimum acc: "power drill" :  0.7656
Mean acc: 0.8859 Mean acc: 0.8396 Mean acc: 0.9615
Standard dev: 0.0463 Standard dev: 0.0723 Standard dev: 0.0235
Maximum acc: "football helmet" :  0.9375 Maximum acc: "football helmet" :  0.9531 Maximum acc: "football helmet" :  0.9922
Minimum acc: "banjo" :  0.7813 Minimum acc: "banjo" :  0.6563 Minimum acc: "Sussex spaniel" :  0.9063
Mean acc: 0.8880 Mean acc: 0.8214 Mean acc: 0.7328
Standard dev: 0.0273 Standard dev: 0.0387 Standard dev: 0.0466
Maximum acc: "brambling" :  0.9375 Maximum acc: "tricycle" :  0.8828 Maximum acc: "guenon monkey" :  0.8125
Minimum acc: "ibex" :  0.8438 Minimum acc: "stretcher" :  0.7578 Minimum acc: "jaguar" :  0.6406
Mean acc: 0.8974 Mean acc: 0.8417 Mean acc: 0.7667
Standard dev: 0.0318 Standard dev: 0.0500 Standard dev: 0.0535
Maximum acc: "brambling" :  0.9531 Maximum acc: "red-backed sandpiper" :  0.9297 Maximum acc: "red-backed sandpiper" :  0.8672
Minimum acc: "ibex" :  0.8438 Minimum acc: "guenon monkey" :  0.7578 Minimum acc: "tench" :  0.6406
Mean acc: 0.7292 Mean acc: 0.6526 Mean acc: 0.8854
Standard dev: 0.0820 Standard dev: 0.0915 Standard dev: 0.0324
Maximum acc: "tench" :  0.8516 Maximum acc: "tricycle" :  0.7813 Maximum acc: "laptop" :  0.9219
Minimum acc: "brambling" :  0.5234 Minimum acc: "brambling" :  0.4219 Minimum acc: "hand-held computer" :  0.8281
Mean acc: 0.4750 Mean acc: 0.3432 Mean acc: 0.2375
Standard dev: 0.1262 Standard dev: 0.1241 Standard dev: 0.1114
Maximum acc: "refrigerator" :  0.625 Maximum acc: "motor scooter" :  0.4844 Maximum acc: "oil platform" :  0.4063
Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.1719 Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.0859 Minimum acc: "tobacco shop" :  0.0625
Mean acc: 0.4271 Mean acc: 0.3490 Mean acc: 0.2380
Standard dev: 0.1533 Standard dev: 0.1493 Standard dev: 0.1155
Maximum acc: "oil platform" :  0.6094 Maximum acc: "motor scooter" :  0.5625 Maximum acc: "oil platform" :  0.4453
Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.1484 Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.0625 Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.0469
Mean acc: 0.2557 Mean acc: 0.1875 Mean acc: 0.4969
Standard dev: 0.1332 Standard dev: 0.1161 Standard dev: 0.1934
Maximum acc: "motor scooter" :  0.5 Maximum acc: "motor scooter" :  0.4141 Maximum acc: "oil platform" :  0.7656
Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.0313 Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.0234 Minimum acc: "alp" :  0.1406
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Figure 8. Results for location: showing the 15 most effective target classes (top), median (middle) and least (bottom).
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